I am urging this Committee to include my language in the FY2027 NDAA directing the Secretary to prioritize U.S.-owned entities with demonstrated capability in this space, and to require a report on the domestic supply chain for quantum dot materials used in SWIR sensor systems. That report should include a concrete, recommended course of action for establishing sufficient domestic supply to meet projected demand by fiscal year 2030.
Push Congress and the Department to prioritize U.S.-owned quantum dot suppliers, require a report on the domestic supply chain, and establish sufficient domestic supply for SWIR sensor materials by FY2030.
Occurrences
I am urging this Committee to include my language in the FY2027 NDAA directing the Secretary to prioritize U.S.-owned entities with demonstrated capability in this space, and to require a report on the domestic supply chain for quantum dot materials used in SWIR sensor systems. That report should include a concrete, recommended course of action for establishing sufficient domestic supply to meet projected demand by fiscal year 2030.
Evidence
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Rep. Biggs told the House Armed Services Committee on April 15, 2026 that she wanted to talk about "short-wave infrared quantum dot materials - SWIR quantum dots," described them as a foundational input for infrared sensor systems, and said the dominant commercial suppliers are in or tied to China while there is no domestically owned producer at sufficient scale.
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On May 14, 2026, the Armed Services hearing statement said the Department is prioritizing quantum sensing and advanced atomic clocks, and that its Office of Strategic Capital has been using loans and commitments to strengthen domestic supply chains and critical materials processing. The statement did not announce any quantum-dot supplier prioritization, domestic supply-chain report, or SWIR-materials production target.
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The House Armed Services FY27 NDAA chairman's mark adds a broad Defense Department supply-chain intelligence and risk-response program plus generic quantum-related research funding, but a text search of the 505-page document found no references to quantum-dot suppliers, SWIR, short-wave infrared, or a U.S.-owned supplier priority.
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The committee's live FY27 NDAA tracker says the chairman's mark was favorably reported 44-12 and lists amendments as they were considered, but searches of the page found no quantum, SWIR, infrared, domestic, or supplier entries tied to Biggs's specific ask.
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Latest action (Sep 14, 2026) Received in the Senate.
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Biggs (SC) R (REVISED) Calls for a study exploring the feasibility
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Biggs (SC) | Republican | SC | Yea
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Cloture motion on the motion to proceed to the measure not invoked in Senate by Yea-Nay Vote.
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develop a plan to strengthen the QIST ecosystem through analyzing QIST supply chains
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The National Quantum Readiness Act codifies two sections of the EO
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"The committee encourages the Secretary of Defense to prioritize U.S.-owned entities"
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"H.R. 8800. An act to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2027"
Assessments
The evidence shows Rep. Biggs advocated for the issue in committee and flagged the domestic SWIR quantum dot supply-chain problem, but it does not show Congress or the Department actually adopted the requested U.S.-owned supplier priority, produced the report, or established sufficient domestic supply by FY2030. The FY27 NDAA materials and DoD testimony advanced related industrial-base and quantum themes, but not this specific commitment.
Biggs has materially advanced the issue by raising SWIR quantum-dot supply-chain concerns in a House Armed Services Committee statement on April 15, 2026, which shows real oversight effort. But the available FY2027 NDAA committee materials and DoD posture evidence do not show the specific promised outcomes: no enacted priority for U.S.-owned quantum-dot suppliers, no required domestic supply-chain report, and no established sufficient domestic SWIR-material supply. Because the promise is specific, tied to federal action, and includes a FY2030 target that has not yet arrived, the record supports that the commitment remains open rather than delivered or failed.
Biggs made a concrete same-term oversight/legislative push in her April 15, 2026 Armed Services statement, asking for FY2027 NDAA language to prioritize U.S.-owned SWIR quantum-dot suppliers and require a domestic supply-chain report with a FY2030 supply plan. However, available subsequent evidence, including May 2026 DoD testimony and the released FY2027 House chairman's mark, does not show the specific prioritization, report requirement, or sufficient domestic SWIR-materials supply was completed. Because the NDAA process and FY2030 target remain pending, this is not a final failure or delivery yet.
Biggs made a same-term committee statement identifying the SWIR quantum dot supply-chain vulnerability and urging attention to domestic, U.S.-owned suppliers. However, the record provided does not show Congress or the Department completed the requested prioritization, required a domestic supply-chain report, or established sufficient domestic supply. Because the FY2030 supply target is still in the future and the promise remains pending rather than failed, the outcome is unresolved, with credit for effort.