This Subcommittee will hold the Navy accountable for restoring these ships to their expected service life.
Hold the Navy accountable for restoring amphibious ships to their expected service life.
Occurrences
This Subcommittee will hold the Navy accountable for restoring these ships to their expected service life.
Evidence
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The committee calendar lists the April 15, 2026 Readiness Subcommittee hearing on "Military Readiness for FY27," with Readiness Subcommittee Chairman Jack Bergman presiding and testimony planned on military training, weapon systems maintenance, and full-spectrum readiness requirements.
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Bergman said the subcommittee should "hold the Navy accountable for restoring these ships to their expected service life" and described the amphibious fleet as a key readiness problem during the April 15, 2026 hearing.
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Marine Corps testimony states that the Amphibious Force Readiness Board and Chief of Naval Operations are addressing persistent ship-readiness gaps, including targeted investments in service life extensions and proactive maintenance for amphibious warships.
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At the Navy FY27 budget hearing, Kelly said the Navy needs to speed up production and procurement of amphibs because current timelines are hamstringing the Marine Corps and making a continuous 3.0 ARG/MEU presence harder.
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Bergman said the readiness mark accelerates readiness through training and maintenance and backs sustainment funding for naval forces, showing continued oversight pressure but not a completed restoration of amphibious ship service life.
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The committee says low availability and prolonged maintenance cycles are delaying amphibious warships, then directs the Navy to brief Congress on integrating additive manufacturing for LHA, LHD, LPD, and LSD sustainment and on operational availability across amphibious classes.
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Bergman identified the amphibious fleet as a readiness crisis, said less than half of amphibious ships were available for tasking, and stated that the Readiness Subcommittee would hold the Navy accountable for restoring the ships to expected service life.
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The committee calendar lists Bergman as the Readiness Subcommittee chairman for a FY27 military readiness hearing covering military training, weapon-system maintenance, and readiness requirements, with Navy and Marine Corps witnesses appearing.
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The Vice Chief of Naval Operations testified that amphibious ships were at 47 percent combat surge readiness, that the Navy acknowledged underperformance in amphibious maintenance, and that a Navy-Marine Corps Amphibious Force Readiness Board was pursuing corrective actions.
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The Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps testified that amphibious warship availability had been reduced by resourcing and materiel challenges, and that the Marine Corps was working with the Navy through the Amphibious Force Readiness Board to identify solutions.
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Marine Corps testimony says the fleet had 32 amphibious ships but was short of the required number of big-deck amphibious assault ships, had not achieved assumed readiness levels, and needed service-life extensions, proactive maintenance, and supply-chain work.
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At the Navy FY27 budget hearing, Seapower chairman Trent Kelly said amphibious ship production and procurement needed to speed up because current timelines were hamstringing the Marine Corps and making continuous ARG/MEU presence harder.
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Bergman said the FY27 readiness mark increased sustainment funding for ground, naval, aviation, and space forces and emphasized maintenance as the fastest way to expand force structure.
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The readiness print says the committee remained concerned about low operational availability and long maintenance cycles for amphibious warfare ships, then directed the Navy to brief Congress on additive manufacturing for LHA, LHD, LPD, and LSD sustainment.
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The readiness print also directed the Navy to brief Congress on amphibious ship operational and availability definitions, current deployable mission-capable ship numbers, maintenance drivers, Readiness Board outcomes, and policy or funding actions needed for a sustained three-MEU presence.
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The House Armed Services Committee calendar identifies the June 4, 2026 full committee markup of H.R. 8800 and links Bergman's Readiness Subcommittee opening statement and the Readiness Subcommittee print among the legislation considered.
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SAN DIEGO–Southwest Regional Maintenance Center (SWRMC), along with industry partners and ship’s force, successfully undocked amphibious assault ship USS America (LHA 6) on-time on Aug 11, marking a major milestone in the completion of their ongoing Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) availability.
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USS America’s CNO availability is slated to complete in 2027.
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The FY2027 NDAA has not been enacted and is not shown in the table.
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Not later than March 1, 2027, the Secretary of the Navy shall submit to the congressional defense committees the following reports:
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the term `temporarily unavailable', when used with respect to an amphibious warfare ship, means that the ship has not surpassed its planned availability by a margin of--
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Bergman | Bergman | Republican | MI | Yea
Assessments
Bergman chaired same-term readiness oversight, publicly pressed the Navy on amphibious ship service-life and availability problems, and advanced FY27 NDAA readiness language requiring Navy briefings and sustainment/accountability reporting. However, official Navy and Marine Corps testimony still showed major readiness shortfalls, low availability, and ongoing service-life-extension needs, so the ships were not shown to have been restored to expected service life. This supports partial delivery with a clear effort badge, not full delivery.
Bergman took concrete same-term oversight actions on this promise: he presided over readiness hearings, publicly pressed the Navy on amphibious readiness, and advanced FY27 NDAA committee language requiring additional Navy reporting on sustainment and availability. That shows meaningful accountability work in office. But the evidence also shows the underlying problem remained ongoing, with low availability, long maintenance cycles, and persistent readiness gaps; there is no clear evidence that amphibious ships were actually restored to their expected service life. That supports partial rather than full delivery.
Bergman materially pursued the promise in his federal House role by chairing a Readiness Subcommittee hearing and publicly pressing the Navy on amphibious ship service-life restoration. The record also shows Marine Corps/Navy readiness mechanisms and service-life-extension investments are addressing the issue during the same term. However, the evidence does not show that amphibious ships were actually restored to their expected service life or that Navy accountability produced a completed outcome, so this is partial delivery rather than full delivery.