the letter urged the Office of the National Cyber Director (ONCD) to develop a federal-industry plan in preparation for a large increase in vulnerability...
Develop a federal-industry plan in preparation for a large increase in AI-discovered software vulnerabilities.
Occurrences
We respectfully request that ONCD convene and coordinate an interagency and federal- industry process ... to take the following steps: 1. Develop a plan to coordinate high volumes of vulnerability disclosures.
the letter urged the Office of the National Cyber Director (ONCD) to develop a federal-industry plan in preparation for a large increase in vulnerability
Evidence
Congressman Bob Latta and Rep. Doris Matsui led a bipartisan letter to National Cyber Director Sean Cairncross. The letter urged ONCD to develop a federal-industry plan in preparation for a large increase in vulnerability disclosures discovered by advanced AI systems.
The letter asks the Office of the National Cyber Director to convene a federal-industry process to develop a plan to coordinate high volumes of vulnerability disclosures generated by advanced AI systems, expand controlled defensive access for trusted defenders, and recommend how the U.S. government can help software vendors validate, triage, and patch vulnerabilities.
ONCD’s stated coordination remit includes cybersecurity policy and strategy, coordination with relevant federal departments and agencies, and awareness and adoption of emerging technology that may enhance or degrade the cybersecurity posture of the United States.
Assessments
Latta co-led and publicly released a bipartisan letter asking ONCD to develop a federal-industry process for AI-discovered vulnerabilities, which is a real effort within the term. But the evidence does not show the requested plan was actually developed, adopted, or implemented, so the promised outcome was not delivered.
Latta materially acted on the promise by co-leading a bipartisan letter urging the Office of the National Cyber Director to convene a federal-industry process and develop the requested plan for handling AI-discovered software vulnerabilities. That is concrete same-term effort toward the promised objective. However, the evidence provided does not show that the federal-industry plan was actually completed, adopted, or implemented by the government. Because there is meaningful action by the candidate but no demonstrated delivery of the promised outcome yet, the best judgment is partial rather than delivered.