I will work to prevent exported advanced AI chips from ending up in the hands of the Chinese military or other foreign adversaries.

If we're going to export advanced AI chips, we need confidence that they don’t end up in the hands of the Chinese military. We’re continuously seeing examples of Chinese espionage, theft, and diversion over and over again. We can’t allow this to keep happening

Mast said the U.S. must ensure exported advanced AI chips do not end up with the Chinese military and cannot allow continued Chinese espionage, theft, and diversion.

Chairman Mast, HFAC, Advances Chip Security Act | Republican Foreign Affairs Committee
primary · press_release · model gpt-5.5

unverified · Source version 36003 · locator unknown

BIS imposed export controls on advanced computing semiconductor chips, supercomputer end uses, and certain China-linked Entity List transactions. The rule states these systems are used by the PRC for military modernization and that BIS intended to limit the PRC's ability to obtain advanced computing chips or develop AI and supercomputer capabilities contrary to U.S. national security interests.

Unverified model/legacy excerpt; not proof. AI summary (separate from source): Official U.S. export controls already targeted advanced computing chips and PRC military/AI use, supporting partial policy delivery, though not specifically attributable to Mast's later individual action.

partial unknown

Federal Register: Implementation of Additional Export Controls: Certain Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items; Supercomputer and Semiconductor End Use; Entity List Modification
secondary · model gpt-5.5 · confidence 93%

unverified · Source version 36003 · locator unknown

The rule created license requirements for exports, reexports, and in-country transfers of identified advanced computing items to or within the PRC, citing historical diversion of PRC-designed chips to support PRC military modernization and the inherent risk of diversion with advanced computing chips.

Unverified model/legacy excerpt; not proof. AI summary (separate from source): The official rule directly addresses the promise's concern that advanced AI-related chips could be diverted to China's military, but it predates the 2026 Mast-specific actions and does not prove full prevention.

partial unknown

Federal Register: Implementation of Additional Export Controls: Certain Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items; Supercomputer and Semiconductor End Use; Entity List Modification
secondary · model gpt-5.5 · confidence 92%

unverified · Source version 36004 · locator unknown

Axios reported that House Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Brian Mast's AI Overwatch Act would require the administration to notify lawmakers before exporting AI chips to China and other adversaries, and would give Congress power to block those exports.

Unverified model/legacy excerpt; not proof. AI summary (separate from source): Mast advanced a concrete legislative proposal aimed at preventing AI chip exports to China and other adversaries, but the report describes a proposal, not enacted law.

partial same_term A for effort

Axios: Exclusive: GOP effort to thwart chip sales to China gains steam
secondary · model gpt-5.5 · confidence 89%

unverified · Source version 32671 · locator unknown

Axios reported that the House Foreign Affairs Committee voted 42-2, with one present, to advance Chair Brian Mast's AI Overwatch Act. The bill would give Congress power to block the Trump administration from exporting AI chips to adversaries and had been introduced by Mast in December.

Unverified model/legacy excerpt; not proof. AI summary (separate from source): The committee vote is strong evidence of Mast working on the promise in the same term, but as of this report the bill still needed floor action and enactment.

partial same_term A for effort

Bill to curb chip sales to China advances out of committee
secondary · model gpt-5.5 · confidence 91%

unverified · Source version 36005 · locator unknown

The report says the AI Overwatch Act would subject higher-performance AI processor exports to Department of Commerce controls plus congressional review, terminate existing licenses, impose a temporary denial period, and allow Congress to block sales such as Nvidia H200 or AMD MI325X exports to Chinese customers.

Unverified model/legacy excerpt; not proof. AI summary (separate from source): The bill's described mechanisms match the promise's objective, and Mast publicly framed it as keeping advanced AI chips away from Chinese military-linked companies. It remained proposed legislation, so it supports effort more than completed delivery.

partial same_term A for effort

Tom's Hardware: Congress wants veto power over Trump administration for AI chip exports
secondary · model gpt-5.5 · confidence 84%

unverified · Source version 36006 · locator unknown

The report says Commerce rules permitted limited exports of Nvidia H200, AMD MI325X, and comparable processors to China and Macau on a case-by-case basis, while requiring testing, end-user disclosures, know-your-customer controls, and limits barring restricted parties such as Chinese military or intelligence agencies.

Unverified model/legacy excerpt; not proof. AI summary (separate from source): This undercuts a finding of full delivery because U.S. policy still allowed some advanced AI chip exports to China, though with safeguards intended to prevent diversion to military or intelligence end users.

partial same_term

Tom's Hardware: U.S. posts official H200 and MI325X AI GPU export rules to China, but with plenty of caveats
secondary · model gpt-5.5 · confidence 78%

unverified · Source version 36007 · locator unknown

Axios reported a new AI chip smuggling case involving alleged diversion of $2.5 billion worth of servers with Nvidia AI chips to China. Mast told Axios that H200s, Blackwells, or any AI chips that could help China win the AI arms race can never have Chinese end users.

Unverified model/legacy excerpt; not proof. AI summary (separate from source): Mast's statement aligns with the promise, but the alleged smuggling case shows the goal was not fully achieved as of March 2026.

never same_term

Axios: AI chip smuggling signals strong Chinese demand
secondary · model gpt-5.5 · confidence 86%

unverified · Source version 36008 · locator unknown

AP reported that three people affiliated with Super Micro Computer were charged with conspiring to illegally export high-performance servers containing advanced Nvidia chips to China from 2024 to 2025. The indictment alleged $2.5 billion in orders and at least $510 million worth of servers diverted to China.

Unverified model/legacy excerpt; not proof. AI summary (separate from source): The indictment allegations are strong evidence that, despite export controls, advanced AI-chip systems still reached or were allegedly diverted toward China during the relevant period, weighing against full fulfillment.

never same_term

Associated Press: 3 men are charged with conspiring to smuggle US artificial intelligence to China
secondary · model gpt-5.5 · confidence 90%

unverified · Source version 36009 · locator unknown

The report says House Select Committee on China Chair John Moolenaar and House Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Brian Mast led a letter urging State and Commerce to press allies for countrywide controls on key semiconductor manufacturing equipment and subcomponents that China cannot produce indigenously.

Unverified model/legacy excerpt; not proof. AI summary (separate from source): This is concrete Mast-led oversight and diplomatic pressure related to preventing China from producing or obtaining advanced chips, though it concerns chipmaking tools more than exported AI chips themselves.

partial same_term A for effort

Tom's Hardware: U.S. lawmakers demand sales ban on chipmaking tools to China
secondary · model gpt-5.5 · confidence 82%

verified · Source version 53392 · locator 1226

All three advanced out of the House Foreign Affairs Committee with substantial bipartisan support and are included in the Senate National Defense Authorization Act managers' package

Fetched verbatim passage. AI summary (separate from source): Within the lookback window, reporting indicated the AI OVERWATCH Act remained alive as part of the Senate NDAA managers' package, but still awaiting floor action.

partial same_term A for effort

Anthropic breaks from major tech group over chips
secondary · model gpt-5.5 · confidence 86%

verified · Source version 53394 · locator 4636

查出有74台伺服器轉售中國，不法獲利逾新台幣6億元

Fetched verbatim passage. AI summary (separate from source): A lookback-window Taiwan prosecution report says 74 advanced Nvidia B300 AI servers were resold to China, showing diversion continued despite controls.

never same_term

輝達台灣分公司經理等8人遭起訴　高階管制品轉銷中國不法獲利逾6億 | 社會 | 中央社 CNA
secondary · model gpt-5.5 · confidence 87%

unverified · Source version 53396 · locator unknown

S.4456 | AI OVERWATCH Act Latest Action: Read twice and referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.

Unverified model/legacy excerpt; not proof. AI summary (separate from source): The Senate companion to the AI OVERWATCH Act was still referred to committee, supporting unresolved status rather than enacted delivery.

unresolved same_term A for effort

Legislation - Senator Jim Banks
secondary · model gpt-5.5 · confidence 90%

unverified · Source version 53398 · locator unknown

278 | 22-Jul | H R 8800 | On Passage | P | National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2027

Unverified model/legacy excerpt; not proof. AI summary (separate from source): The House passed the FY2027 NDAA in July; this supports progress on the legislative vehicle but not final enactment.

partial same_term A for effort

U.S. House of Representatives Roll Call Votes
secondary · model gpt-5.5 · confidence 82%

unverified · Source version 53400 · locator unknown

Motion to Invoke Cloture: Motion to Proceed to S. 4784

Unverified model/legacy excerpt; not proof. AI summary (separate from source): The Senate roll-call record showed a failed July cloture vote on the FY2027 NDAA motion to proceed, leaving the NDAA path unresolved.

unresolved same_term

U.S. Senate: Roll Call Votes 119th Congress - 2nd Session (2026)
secondary · model gpt-5.5 · confidence 86%

verified · Source version 53402 · locator 1038

BIS will now review export license applications for the Nvidia H200, AMD MI325X, and similar chips on a case-by-case basis

Fetched verbatim passage. AI summary (separate from source): Official policy still allowed some advanced AI-chip exports to China under conditions, undercutting a finding that the prevention goal was fully delivered.

partial same_term

Lock
secondary · model gpt-5.5 · confidence 91%

verified · Source version 66301 · locator 198

Despite years of Western export controls, restricted NVIDIA AI chips continue to reach China.

Fetched verbatim passage. AI summary (separate from source): A lookback-window research report found restricted Nvidia AI chips still reaching China, weighing against full prevention of diversion to China or adversary-linked end users.

never same_term

Covert Compute - C4ADS
secondary · model gpt-5.5 · confidence 86%

verified · Source version 66303 · locator 4000

the Senate has taken no further procedural steps toward taking up the bill on the floor.

Fetched verbatim passage. AI summary (separate from source): CRS’s September status report showed the Senate NDAA vehicle remained stalled, so the AI OVERWATCH path had not become enacted law by the lookback period.

unresolved same_term

FY2027 NDAA: Status of Legislative Activity
secondary · model gpt-5.5 · confidence 84%

verified · Source version 66305 · locator 1483

support of including strengthened chip export control provisions in the final version of the FY2027 National Defense Authorization Act

Fetched verbatim passage. AI summary (separate from source): Within the lookback window, outside groups were still urging inclusion of AI-chip export-control provisions in the final NDAA, indicating continuing effort but not enacted delivery.

partial same_term A for effort

Conservative Coalition Urges House Leadership to Include Safeguards Against Chinese AI Chip Development in FY2027 NDAA  - American Compass
secondary · model gpt-5.5 · confidence 78%

unverified · Source version 66307 · locator unknown

OFFERED BY MR. MAST OF FLORIDA ... shall require a license for the export, reexport, or in-country transfer

Unverified model/legacy excerpt; not proof. AI summary (separate from source): Official House bill text shows Mast-backed legislative work to require licenses for covered AI-chip transfers to countries of concern, supporting concrete effort toward the promise.

partial same_term A for effort

Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 6875 Offered by Mr. Mast of Florida
secondary · model gpt-5.5 · confidence 90%

unverified · Source version 66309 · locator unknown

There is a case-by-case license review policy for license applications for exports of commodities

Unverified model/legacy excerpt; not proof. AI summary (separate from source): Current export-control regulations still allow some advanced-computing exports to China or Macau under case-by-case licensing, supporting partial controls rather than full prevention.

partial same_term

eCFR :: 15 CFR 742.6 -- Regional stability.
secondary · model gpt-5.5 · confidence 88%

verified · Source version 66311 · locator 6086

the co-conspirators intended for the U.S.-origin AI chips to be diverted to China.

Fetched verbatim passage. AI summary (separate from source): DOJ allegations show continued attempted diversion of U.S.-origin AI chips to China during the relevant period, undercutting a finding that the prevention outcome was fully achieved.

never same_term

Office of Public Affairs | Chinese National and Two U.S. Citizens Charged with Conspiring to Smuggle Artificial Intelligence Technology to China | United States Department of Justice
secondary · model gpt-5.5 · confidence 89%